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Abstract  
This article focuses on the nature of 
interethnic conflicts in the newly inde-
pendent states of the former Soviet Union. 
The author discusses the prevailing pat-
terns that characterize such conflicts and 
gives a brief account of the changes that 
took place in the newly independent states 
over the past decade that laid the ground 
for the present volatile sociopolitical cli-
mate there. Apart from the material causes 
of conflict, a lot of attention is given to 
psychological causes such as the loss of 
identity which is being compensated by a 
growing nationalism. In the opinion of the 
author, these psychological causes should 
be given much more attention in order to 
predict and prevent outbreaks of 
interethnic conflicts in the area.  
Precis  
Cet article etudie la nature des con flits 
inter-ethniques dans les nouveaux Etats 
independants de I'Ex-Union Sovietique. L' 
auteur decrit les principales caracteris-
tiques de ces con flits et donne un bref 
compte-rendu des changements ayant eu 
lieu dans ces Etats au cours de la derniere 
decennie qui sont it l' origine de l' actuel 
climat sociopolitique volatile dans cette 
partie du monde. Mis it part les causes 
materielles de con flit, une attention par-
ticuliere es t accordee aux causes psycho-
logiques telle la perte d'identite qui est 
compensee par une nationalisme gran-
dissant. Selon l' auteur, davantage d' at-
tention doit etre accordee it ces causes  
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psychologiques afin de predire et prevenir 
de nouveaux con flits inter-ethniques dans 
cette region.  
Conflicts that developed in the Newly 
Independent States (NIS) of the former 
Soviet Union over the past decade sur-
prised an international community un-
prepared to address the consequences 
effectively. Even less was it ready to 
engage in preventive activity. One reason 
is that these conflicts were unusual in 
their development, for the whole post-
socialist and post-Soviet environment is 
an essentially new experience. Not all 
military conflicts in the former Soviet 
Union can be considered" interethnic". It 
does not apply, for instance to the 
October 1993 events in Moscow. One 
can say that to some extent, most con-
flicts had an "interethnic" component. 
The ethnic component may be obvious as 
in Karabakh, Abkhazia and Ossetia. This 
paper focuses primarily on conflicts that 
can be clearly characterized as 
"interethnic" though some conclusions 
may apply to other cases.  
Seeking to understand interethnic 
conflicts that developed in the post-So-
viet space one may discern strange pat-
terns at first defying understanding:  
1) Conflicts are often seen as a dispute 
over some kind of "pie" -territory, 
various types of resources, etc. How-
ever, in the case of the NIS it is diffi-
cult to discern which particular "pie" 
the dispute was about. While a certain 
redistribution of resources does 
occur, along with a serious decrease 
of everything, it is hard to speculate 
that this distribution was the real 
cause of conflict. We may also notice 
a tendency to see more "struggle over 
resources" component in conflicts 
appearing less "interethnic"-such as 
Chechnya or Tadjikistan.  
2) It is difficultto fit the conflicts of the 
Newly Independent States into an  
 
"oppressor-oppressed" framework. 
Seventy years of Soviet rule had a 
profound "levelling" effect on the 
economic development of the regions 
of the former USSR with the result 
that it was generally the better-
developed regions that perceived 
themselves to be suffering from the 
system. But after the disintegration of 
the USSR these concerns seem to 
have no reason to linger. When we 
look at local conflicts it is usually 
surprising how little evidence of real 
"oppression" can be found. Com-
monly, the oppression perceptions of 
both conflicting parties were much the 
same on both sides.  
3) Finally,butmostastonishing,forthe 
short-term outcome of interethnic 
conflicts in the former USSR, we can 
observe more or less clearly a rule 
that "the weaker side wins."So far the 
time frame is insufficient to ad-
equately appreciate long-term con-
sequences. The Ingush-Ossetian 
conflict in the Suburban region of 
North Ossetia during 1992 may be an 
exception where the Ingush 
population was forced to leave while 
Ossetian forces were supported in a 
few days of conflict by Russian Fed-
eral troops. In Moldova, Georgia, 
Azerbaijan and Russia, small ethnic 
autonomies took on their central 
governments by an armed struggle 
reaching de facto independence with 
control over their own territory. This 
is commonly explained by claims of 
foreign interference. My experience 
throughout five years work as a peace 
activist in the conflict zones is that 
while such interference played its 
role, it was never sufficient to explain 
the paradox. In the case of the Russian 
government whose various branches 
are in constant struggle with each 
other, in practically every interethnic 
conflict of former USSR states, 
Russia sup-  
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ported both sides in one way or an-
other and was consequently blamed or 
held responsible by both sides of each 
respective conflict.  
To understand ethnic conflicts in the 
)Ost-Soviet states we must first under-
;tand the character of the changes takng 
place in these countries over the past 
iecade. This means renouncing idealisic 
illusions about the events.  
The dramatic change that took place 
m the territory of the former USSR dur-
ng the 1980s and early 1990s was a 
'revolution from the top." It was not 
nfluenced by the masses at the base of he 
social pyramid, nor by idealistic 
ntellectuals or former "dissidents." It -
vas the huge bureaucratic elite, formed 
hrough many decades of communist ule, 
that pushed for reforms. These peo)le 
had successfully climbed to high evels of 
the Soviet government apparaus and 
became tired of the limitations mposed 
on them by the communist sys:em. 
Perestroika and glasnost served as heir 
opportunity to move from manage~ial 
positions to become owners, so they 
:ould openly use resources under their 
:ontrol for increased personal con-
iumption and power. This was a ''bour-
;eois revolution" happening in unique 
jrcumstances.  
Historically, such change came at an 
~arlier stage of industrial development n 
countries where the majority of the 
)opulation was peasantry with a fairly 
)rimitive life style and zero, or a very ow 
level of, education. Changes in such 
iocieties would have much greater and 
nore rapid impact on the position of the 
~lite than on the mass population.  
The situation in the USSR was utterly 
Efferent. The Soviet Union was well 
ieveloped by many parameters despite 
;ome serious deficiencies. More imp or-
:ant, the old system on the one hand, left 
Jeople totally unprepared for a market 
;ystem, and on the other, had made peo-
Jle extremely dependent on the extenlive 
social safety net. This comprised :ree (if 
low quality) medical care, free :and 
fairly good) education, free :though often 
inadequate) housing, mbsidized 
transportation, utilities, ~tc.-
togetherprovided a fairly low but lecent 
standard ofliving for almost the  
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entire population. People were concerned 
not that the system was bad in itself, but 
that it was not functioning properly-it 
was not sufficiently "just." People were 
upset not that the system was forcing 
them to be" equal," but that some were 
"more equal than others". What first 
brought popularity to Russia's current 
president Yeltsin were his statements on 
the need to cut privileges of the ruling 
elite. His rhetoric blended well with-as 
Leo Tolstoy onceputitthat "everybody is 
satisfied with his brain, but no one is 
satisfied with his money!"  
Taking all into account, itisclearthat 
the changes that happened went, right-
fully or not, directly contrary to the ex-
pectations and wishes of most people. 
This is most notable in the privatization 
of state property in most post-Soviet 
states. A very appropriate historical 
analogy may be the case of European 
settlers buying for tokens huge pieces of 
land from American natives who obvi-
ously did not appreciate the significance 
of the transaction.  
The changes caused destruction of 
most pieces of the existing" safety net" 
which had come to playa vital role in 
most people's lives. This was all com-
plicated by the wrecking of the Soviet 
Union as a country and integrated trading 
region. So while the changes can be 
characterized as a "revolution from the 
top" they were like a devastating earth-
quake, destroying and disrupting the 
whole political, economic and social 
fabric of the existing social order. For 
most people, all that they counted on, 
hoped for, looked up to, was blown 
away. In such circumstances, itis amaz-
ing how patient and tolerant people have 
been, and how relatively little turmoil 
change of such magnitude has created so 
far.  
Along with loss of life's" social fab-
ric," the collective mentality has been 
severely affected on the psychological 
level.  
Clearly, by no means everyone was 
totally committed to communist con-
cepts. If this had been the case, such 
changes would have had no chance of 
taking place. But at the same time, many 
elements of communist ideology had  
 
become widely accepted and incorporated 
into the culture. Even before communism, 
there were collective traditions. Many 
"dissidents" opposingthe old system 
wanted to reform it, so it would work 
according to its officially stated principles 
and teachings that were conspicuously 
betrayed by the official custodians. This 
can be clearly seen by studying the jokes 
of the times:  
"Communist leader Leonid Breznev 
invites his mother to visit him in Mos-
cow. He shows her his huge apartment, 
takes her out to a huge mansion, a 'dacha,' 
and shows her his pool, etc. After he 
demonstrates all his wealth, she looks at 
him saying: 'Dear son, I am so happy for 
you, but I am so afraid of what might 
happen to you if the Bolsheviks come 
back!'"  
In reality, the main reference frame of 
"ideological identification" for most 
people were elements of communist ide-
ology-"Soviet" patriotism (i.e. nation-
alism) and ethnic, religious and cultural 
background. The basis for the first two 
elements was blown away by the gales of 
change. The more significant these were 
in people's minds, the more pronounced 
their perception of loss was.  
Loss of social and psychological se-
curity led to a terrifying existential 
vacuum. Along with sudden loss of the 
Soviet organization and economy came 
new hardships associated with loss of the 
familiar "socialfabric." People suddenly 
exposed to losses and new fears began to 
take refuge in fundamental ethnic and 
religious identities. The explosion of 
"nationalism" was not due to "lifting the 
lid" from any formerly repressed 
tensions. It is the direct result and 
manifestation of profound change.  
The need for identity formation, the 
need to understand one's place and role in 
life, the need to knowwhatto rely on, 
whom to trust and how to plan for to-
morrow, i.e. psychological orientation 
and human security, is no less important 
for survival than the need for food.  
Discord in people's minds can become 
manifest as social unrest or worse. It will 
be impossible to heal social conflicts 
without taking care of people's minds and 
their psychological needs.  













Clearly, claims of various ethnic 
groups sharing the same territory, re-
sources, and a contradictory interpreta-
tion of history, set the conditions for 
conflict. The peculiarity is that there 
might not be any "objective" reason to 
explain this. Interethnic conflicts come 
not as a result of contradictions over 
specific issues-though such issues are 
always present in conflicts-they develop 
on the base of the profound psychological 
impact that the changes over the past ten 
years had on the people of the former 
USSR. This psychological environment is 
liable to exploitation by a certain type of 
political aspirant that preys on national 
sentiments, historical events, and 
identifies scapegoats to blame for 
hardships that people face.  
In order to better understand conflict 
dynamics, in addition to "material" fac-
tors (shortage of certain resources, eco-
nomic inequality,· etc.) we must 
recognize psychological and spiritual 
factors. It is especially important to un-
derstand the perception ofloss over the 
past years influencing self-identification.  
For the ethnic majorities in former 
Soviet Republics, "psychological loss" 
may be mitigated by winning independ-
ence. Ethnicity for them was relatively 
stronger than their "soviet" or "socialist" 
identity. Ethnic minorities in former 
republics traditionally placed hope in 
central government to "counterbalance" 
republican leadership. Now the 
"counterbalance" is gone, leaving mi-
norities increasingly vulnerable. "Psy-
chologicalloss" may not reflect a visible 
reality or decline in standards ofliving, 
availability of resources, etc. Some 
groups have come to fear losing their 
identity in the new environment. Such 
fear can mobilize strong responses in 
small or threatened groups and may 
induce formation of new coalitions or 
apparently irrational behaviour.  
Wars in the former Soviet Union usu-
ally show asimilar level of weaponry 
from the arsenal of the Soviet Army. In 
the absence of one side having a great 
technological advantage over the other, 
the situation favours "resources against 
dedication". The militaries of the Newly 
Independent States are sig-  
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nificantly stronger than opponents in 
terms of resources available, at least at 
the early stages of conflict. However, 
opponents are much stronger in the term 
of dedication to a cause. Wars may be 
divided into "those which can be lost" 
and "those which cannot be lost." So far, 
dedication, based on fear of losing the 
last "safe haven" in this troubled world--
ethnic identity-has proven to be much 
stronger factor for the outcome of the 
crisis than visible advantage of having 
various resources necessary to manage 
the war. This is explains the socalled 
"weaker-win" phenomenon. More 
important than how strong you are, is 
how afraid are you of losing.  
When we look at post-conflict situa-
tions today, we can observe that "win-
ners" are in a comparatively worse 
situation than losers. The absence of 
economic resources worsened by the lack 
of international recognition plays its role 
in the long run. However, this situation 
only strengthens the power of the ruling 
elite and allows it to sustain fear of 
another war among local population, 
which increases risk for further conflict. 
Post-war regions suffer from high levels 
of crime--even compared to the high 
overall crime level of the former USSR. 
This facilitates further authoritarian rule 
(rather characteristic among the NIS 
states).  
Toynbee: One cause for the recent 
outbreak of lawlessness in a 
number of fields of life is the 
turning of men into soldiers in the 
two world wars, and in the many 
local wars that have been waged 
since 1914. War is a deliberate 
reversal of the normal inhibition 
against taking human life. For a 
soldier, killing his fellow human 
being is a duty instead of being the 
crime that it is if he commits 
murder as a civilian. This arbitrary 
and immoral reversal of a major 
ethical rule is bewildering and 
demoralizing in itself. Moreover, a 
soldier on active service is torn out 
of his customary social setting and 
is therefore released from all his 
customary social restraints. When 
he is commanded to kill, it is no 
wonder that he also ceases to be 
governed by other normal 
inhibitions against raping, looting, 
and drug taking. The 
demoralization of American troops 
in Vietnam was an extreme  
 
case of what always happens to sol-
diers on campaign.  
Ikeda: In all ages, war brings this 
kind of demoralization)  
Desperation, crime, and authoritarian 
rule are factors leading to further 
strengthening of the existing vicious 
cycle and, consequently, to the future 
conflict. On the other hand, as time goes 
by, people psychologically adjustto the 
new environment and the possibilities for 
mobilizing them around the same goals as 
in the past diminish. This contradictory 
situation must be well understood when 
we consider choices the international 
community may have to address such 
problems.  
It is unjust and counterproductive to 
try to solve these problems by applying 
new or other forms of pressure or vio-
lence. For example, applying economic 
sanctions against parties involved serves 
no one. Helping people to adjust 
economically and psychologically to the 
new situation; supporting" grassroots" 
activities and local NGOs as essential 
elements needed for building democratic 
civil societies, is a much better option for 
conflict prevention and resolution.  
If we really want to understand what is 
going on in NIS states and be able to 
predict and prevent future outbreaks of 
violence, we must focus more research on 
psychological aspects of the present 
situation. We should examine suchfactors 
as: what have people lost over the past 
years in terms of their self-identification; 
how strong are their fears; and what 
events or phenomena may trigger violent 
or explosive responses etc.  
My experience with interethnic con-
flicts is as a peace activist, not a psy-
chologist. However, I have learned from 
my experience, that we must use psy-
chological insight in analysis of these 
pre-conflict and conflict situations. A 
better psychology and wiser therapy seem 
to be needed in order to cope with 
continuing challenges in the Newly In-
dependent States._  
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